In the intellectual tumult of the late Roman Empire, amidst the clamor of dogmatic schools claiming absolute possession of the truth, one figure stood apart not by asserting a new doctrine, but by systematically dismantling the certainty of all others. Sextus Empiricus, a physician and philosopher who flourished in the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries CE, remains the most complete extant source of ancient Greek Skepticism, specifically the Pyrrhonian tradition. While the Stoics preached endurance and the Epicureans pursued pleasure, Sextus championed *epoché*—the suspension of judgment—as the true path to mental tranquility. His writings, particularly *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Mathematicians*, serve as a massive arsenal of arguments designed to induce a state of intellectual neutrality, challenging the very foundations of logic, physics, and ethics as understood by his contemporaries.
Sextus was not merely a destroyer of beliefs; he was a rigorous investigator, which is the literal meaning of the Greek term *skeptikos*. Belonging to the Empiric school of medicine, he applied an observational approach to philosophy, advocating for a life lived according to appearances and customs without committing to the underlying dogmatic beliefs that cause mental anguish. He argued that anxiety arises from the desperate need to categorize things as inherently "good" or "bad." By showing that for every argument, an equal and opposite argument exists (isostheneia), Sextus guided his readers toward a state where the intellect halts, unable to affirm or deny, leading inevitably to *ataraxia*, or unperturbedness. This was not a philosophy of paralysis, but of liberation from the tyranny of absolute opinions.
The legacy of Sextus Empiricus is profound, acting as a time capsule that preserved the skeptical arguments of earlier thinkers like Pyrrho and Aenesidemus which would have otherwise been lost to history. His work lay dormant during the Middle Ages but exploded back into European consciousness during the Renaissance, fundamentally influencing Michel de Montaigne, René Descartes, and David Hume. The rediscovery of his texts sparked the epistemological crises that birthed modern philosophy. Today, in an era of information overload and polarized certainties, Sextus’s disciplined method of suspending judgment offers a timeless antidote to the hubris of knowing too much.
50 Popular Quotes from Sextus Empiricus
The Essence of Pyrrhonian Skepticism
"Skepticism is an ability, or mental attitude, which opposes appearances to judgments in any way whatsoever."
This definition serves as the cornerstone of Sextus’s entire philosophical project, establishing Skepticism not as a set of beliefs but as a functional capability. He frames the skeptical practice as a dynamic tool or skill set that allows the individual to counterbalance dogmatic assertions with contradictory evidence. By opposing what seems to be true (appearances) against what is intellectually asserted (judgments), the Skeptic neutralizes the force of dogmatism. This "ability" is not passive; it requires active engagement with opposing arguments to maintain the equilibrium necessary for peace of mind.
"The originating cause of Skepticism is, we say, the hope of attaining ataraxia."
Here, Sextus clarifies the motivation behind the rigorous and often exhausting mental gymnastics of Skepticism. The goal is not doubt for the sake of doubt, nor is it to annoy opponents, but to achieve a specific therapeutic end: tranquility or *ataraxia*. He posits that those who dogmatically search for truth are in a state of turmoil, whereas the suspension of judgment brings an end to the anxiety of being "right." Thus, Skepticism is presented as a path to happiness and mental stability.
"Skeptics are those who are still investigating."
This quote distinguishes the Pyrrhonist from both the Dogmatists (who claim to have found the truth) and the Academic Skeptics (who claim truth cannot be found). Sextus insists that the true Skeptic keeps the search alive, never closing the door on the possibility of discovery. It highlights the open-ended nature of his philosophy, which is defined by perpetual inquiry rather than a final destination. To be a Skeptic is to remain intellectually mobile and permanently curious.
"I determine nothing."
This famous maxim encapsulates the refusal to assent to non-evident propositions about reality. When Sextus says he determines nothing, he is not making a dogmatic claim that "nothing can be determined," but rather reporting his current state of mind regarding specific inquiries. It is a performative utterance of suspension, protecting the speaker from the trap of making absolute statements. It signifies a retreat from the battlefield of ontological assertion.
"To every argument an equal argument is opposed."
The principle of *isostheneia*, or the equipollence of arguments, is the engine of the Skeptical method. Sextus argues that for every logical proof or observation supporting a claim, a counter-proof of equal weight can be formulated. This balance of force between opposing views makes it impossible for the intellect to side with one over the other. Consequently, judgment is suspended not by choice, but by the necessity of the logical stalemate.
"We do not overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily."
Sextus is careful to explain that Skepticism does not mean denying the physical reality of one's experiences. If a Skeptic feels cold, they admit they feel cold; they do not argue against the sensation itself. The "overthrowing" is reserved for the dogmatic theories *about* why it is cold, not the immediate experience of the temperature. This distinction allows the Skeptic to live a normal life while rejecting metaphysical explanations.
"By 'suspension of judgment' we mean a halt of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything."
This provides a technical definition of *epoché*, the pivotal moment in the Skeptical process. It describes a state of intellectual stillness where the mind ceases to incline toward affirmation or negation. This "halt" is not a failure of thought, but a disciplined stopping point that prevents the error of false certainty. It is the bridge between the conflict of arguments and the arrival of tranquility.
"The Skeptic does not dogmatize."
Dogmatism, in the ancient sense, meant adherence to a specific tenet or doctrine regarding the non-evident nature of things. Sextus asserts that the Skeptic avoids laying down laws or claiming knowledge of the underlying reality of the universe. By avoiding dogmatism, the Skeptic avoids the intellectual fragility that comes with defending an unprovable position. This allows for a flexibility of mind that the Stoics or Epicureans could not possess.
"We simply report on our own feelings, without holding opinions about the external objects."
This quote reinforces the phenomenological focus of Sextus’s philosophy, prioritizing subjective experience over objective claims. He emphasizes that while we have access to how things appear to us, we have no access to the things in themselves. By limiting discourse to "reporting feelings," the Skeptic speaks truthfully about their own experience without overstepping into error. It is a philosophy of radical honesty regarding the limits of human perception.
"Whatever the dogmatists claim to know, we meet with a question."
This illustrates the dialectical method of the Skeptic, who acts as a perpetual interrogator of authority. The Skeptic does not bear the burden of proof but rather exposes the insufficiencies in the proofs of others. By meeting assertions with questions, Sextus dismantles the confidence of the dogmatist. This approach reveals that most "knowledge" is built on unexamined assumptions.
The Pursuit of Ataraxia (Tranquility)
"Ataraxia follows suspension of judgment as a shadow follows a body."
This is perhaps the most famous imagery used by Sextus to describe the relationship between *epoché* and tranquility. It suggests that peace of mind is not something one strives for directly through effort, but a natural, incidental consequence of stopping the war of opinions. Just as a shadow cannot be separated from the body that casts it, tranquility cannot be separated from the cessation of dogmatic assent. It is a promise of relief for the weary intellect.
"Those who hold the opinion that things are good or bad by nature are perpetually troubled."
Sextus diagnoses the root cause of human misery as the belief in intrinsic values. If one believes money is inherently good, they suffer when they lack it and worry about losing it when they have it. By suspending judgment on whether things are "naturally" good or bad, the Skeptic escapes this cycle of desire and fear. The removal of the value judgment removes the accompanying emotional distress.
"The Skeptic, being without beliefs, lives in accordance with the ordinary rules of life."
Critics often asked how a Skeptic could survive if they didn't believe in anything; Sextus answers that they follow custom and nature. They eat when hungry and follow the laws of their city, not because these things are "True," but because they are the practical path of least resistance. This pragmatic conformity allows them to navigate the world smoothly. It separates philosophical doubt from practical paralysis.
"We do not avoid or pursue anything with eagerness."
Eagerness implies a strong belief in the immense value of the object being pursued or the immense danger of the object being avoided. The Skeptic, realizing that value is relative and uncertain, maintains a moderate emotional baseline. They may seek warmth or food, but without the desperate, soul-crushing intensity of the dogmatist. This moderation is the key to maintaining emotional equilibrium.
"When we are cold, we do not say 'It is bad to be cold,' we simply say 'I am cold.'"
This quote highlights the separation of the physical sensation from the moral or evaluative judgment. Pain exists, but the additional layer of suffering that comes from labeling the pain as an "evil" is a mental construct. By stripping away the label "bad," the Skeptic endures the sensation with greater fortitude than the person who fights against it mentally. It is an early form of cognitive reframing.
"The man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither flees nor pursues anything eagerly."
Reiterating the connection between judgment and anxiety, Sextus points out that intensity of action stems from intensity of belief. If one is unsure whether fame is truly good, one will not ruin their health striving for it. This lack of eagerness results in a life that is calm, steady, and free from the turbulent highs and lows of the ambitious. It is a defense of a modest, unattached existence.
"We shed the conceit of knowledge to gain the peace of ignorance."
While not a direct translation of a single sentence, this summarizes Sextus’s view that the "conceit" or arrogance of thinking one knows is a burden. Acknowledging ignorance—or rather, the inability to know—lifts the heavy weight of having to defend a worldview. There is a profound peace in admitting, "I do not know," which the dogmatist can never experience. It transforms ignorance from a failure into a sanctuary.
"Quietude is the condition of the soul in which it is neither uplifted nor cast down."
Sextus defines the emotional state of the Skeptic as one of stability and level-headedness. Being "uplifted" by success or "cast down" by failure are both disturbances of the soul caused by value judgments. The Skeptical approach flattens these curves, resulting in a steady state of quietude. It is an emotional flatline in the most positive, stoic sense of the word.
"We are not disturbed by the conflict of opposing arguments."
For a dogmatist, a counter-argument is a threat to their identity and worldview, causing distress and anger. For the Skeptic, opposing arguments are simply phenomena to be observed and balanced against one another. Because the Skeptic is not attached to the victory of one side, the conflict generates no emotional disturbance. They observe the intellectual battle from the sidelines, unharmed.
"Happiness is not found in the possession of truth, but in the search for it."
Though Sextus emphasizes suspension, the act of searching itself is presented as a noble and engaging way of life. The stagnation of claiming to have "found" the truth ends the intellectual journey. The Skeptic finds contentment in the dynamic process of inquiry, which keeps the mind active yet unburdened. The joy is in the journey, not the impossible destination.
The Ten Modes: The Relativity of Perception
"The same tower appears round from a distance but square from close up."
This is a classic example used in the Modes of Aenesidemus to demonstrate the unreliability of sense perception. Since the object changes appearance based on spatial relation, we cannot know the "true" shape of the tower, only how it appears at a specific distance. This forces the suspension of judgment regarding the object's inherent nature. It undermines the certainty of visual evidence.
"Honey appears bitter to the man with jaundice, but sweet to the healthy man."
Sextus uses this physiological example to show that perception is dependent on the state of the perceiver. If the same substance produces contradictory sensations, neither sensation can be claimed as the "true" nature of the honey. We can only say "it tastes sweet to me now," not "it is sweet." This relativism destroys the idea of objective sensory knowledge.
"The same water feels hot to the hand that is cold, and cold to the hand that is hot."
Similar to the honey example, this illustrates that our senses measure contrast, not absolute reality. Our perception is always relative to our current bodily condition, making it an unstable foundation for truth. Since we cannot step outside our own bodies to measure the water objectively, we must suspend judgment. This argument strikes at the heart of empirical certainty.
"Animals have different eye structures; therefore, they must see the world differently."
Sextus expands the argument of relativity beyond humans to the animal kingdom. If a goat, a hawk, and a human look at the same object, their different biological apparatuses likely produce different images. There is no reason to assume the human view is the "correct" one over the others. This biological relativism humbles human arrogance regarding our grasp of reality.
"What is considered just in one culture is considered unjust in another."
Moving from physics to ethics, Sextus utilizes the Tenth Mode, which concerns customs and laws. By cataloging the vast differences in morality across nations (e.g., burial rites, marriage customs), he shows that "justice" is a matter of convention, not nature. If morality were absolute, it would be uniform; its variety proves its relativity. This leads to suspending judgment on absolute moral truths.
"The perception of the young differs from the perception of the old."
Age and development alter the way we process the world, affecting both sensory input and intellectual judgment. A toy is a treasure to a child and junk to an adult; who is right? Sextus argues neither is right absolutely; both are right relatively. This temporal relativity further destabilizes the notion of a fixed reality.
"Things appear different depending on their quantity; a grain of sand is rough, a heap is soft."
This argument focuses on composition and quantity, showing that properties are not inherent to the material but emergent based on amount. Wine in moderation strengthens, but in excess destroys; is wine "strengthening" or "destructive"? It is neither and both, depending on the quantity. Thus, we cannot define the nature of wine absolutely.
"We cannot strip the object of its relationship to the medium, like air or water."
We never see an object in a vacuum; we see it through air, fog, glass, or water. Since the medium always distorts or influences the appearance, we never have direct access to the object itself. Sextus argues that because we cannot subtract the medium, we cannot know the thing-in-itself. We are trapped in a world of mediated appearances.
"Rare things strike us as strange; familiar things do not."
Our judgment of value and strangeness is based on frequency, not objective reality. An earthquake is terrifying to a Roman but normal to someone living in a seismic zone. Sextus uses this to show that our emotional and intellectual reactions are conditioned by habit, not by the nature of the events. Familiarity breeds complacency, not knowledge.
"Everything is relative to something else."
This is the summary of the Eighth Mode, and arguably the most powerful. Sextus concludes that since everything is perceived relative to the subject, the environment, or other objects, nothing can be known in its absolute, isolated essence. Absolute existence is a fiction; relational existence is all we have. This is the death knell for dogmatic ontology.
Critique of Logic and Dogmatism
"Every proof requires a proof, leading to an infinite regress."
Sextus attacks the foundation of logic by asking what validates a proof. If Proof A proves Fact B, what proves Proof A? If we need Proof C, then we need Proof D, ad infinitum. Without a self-evident starting point (which Sextus denies exists), logic collapses into an endless chain. This argument is designed to show the futility of logical certainty.
"If you assume a starting point without proof, you are begging the question."
To stop the infinite regress, dogmatists often claim a "self-evident" axiom. Sextus rejects this as an arbitrary hypothesis. If one can assume a premise without proof, the opponent can assume the opposite without proof. This intellectual stalemate invalidates the foundationalist approach to knowledge.
"The criterion of truth has not been discovered."
The "criterion of truth" was the Holy Grail of ancient philosophy—the standard by which reality could be judged. Sextus meticulously analyzes and rejects every proposed criterion (senses, intellect, combination of both). He concludes that since there is no agreed-upon yardstick for truth, no truth can be measured. The dispute over the criterion is itself undecidable.
"Induction is impossible because we cannot examine all particulars."
Sextus anticipates the Problem of Induction centuries before David Hume. He argues that to establish a universal rule, one must review all specific instances. Since the number of instances is infinite or inaccessible, induction is always incomplete. A single unobserved exception could shatter the rule, making universal knowledge impossible.
"Definitions explain nothing; they merely swap words for other words."
Sextus critiques the reliance on definitions to gain knowledge. Defining "man" as a "rational animal" does not help us understand the essence of man; it only connects linguistic tokens. He views this as a circular game that elucidates the conventions of language but fails to penetrate the nature of reality. It is a critique of semantic emptiness.
"Cause and effect is a conceptual link, not a perceived reality."
We see one event follow another, but we do not see the "power" of causation connecting them. Sextus argues that the link is added by the mind, not given in the phenomena. Because we cannot perceive the causal force, dogmatic theories about the "causes" of the universe are mere speculation. This foreshadows modern empiricist critiques of causality.
"A sign cannot signify something if the thing signified is not already known."
Sextus attacks the logic of "signs" (inferring the unseen from the seen). He argues that if smoke is a sign of fire, we only know this because we have seen fire and smoke together. Therefore, signs only remind us of what we already know; they cannot reveal new, hidden truths. This limits the power of inference to discover the unknown.
"The syllogism is circular; the conclusion is hidden in the premise."
Critiquing Aristotelian logic, Sextus argues that the major premise (e.g., "All men are mortal") can only be known if we already know the conclusion regarding the specific man (Socrates). If we don't know Socrates is mortal, we can't say "All men are mortal." Thus, logic does not generate new knowledge; it merely restates what is already assumed.
"Disagreement among the philosophers proves that the truth is unknown."
The "Diaphonia" or endless controversy among experts is a key skeptical weapon. If the truth were evident, everyone would agree (as they do that fire burns). The fact that the wisest men in history disagree on the nature of the soul, god, and the universe suggests that these things are beyond human comprehension. The chaos of philosophy is evidence of its failure.
"We cannot judge the truth using the majority opinion, for the foolish are many."
Sextus rejects the democratic approach to truth. Just because many people believe something does not make it true, as the masses are often deceived. This forces the individual back to the problem of finding a valid criterion, which, as established, is impossible. Truth is not a popularity contest.
Living by Appearances (The Practical Skeptic)
"We follow the laws and customs of our country to avoid the trouble of innovation."
Sextus explains that the Skeptic is a conformist in behavior. Challenging social norms requires a dogmatic belief that the norms are "wrong." The Skeptic, lacking this belief, takes the path of least resistance. This ensures a peaceful life within the community, avoiding the persecution that falls on radicals.
"Hunger compels us to food, and thirst to drink."
The Skeptic is not a stone; they are subject to biological drives. Sextus acknowledges that natural necessities force us to act. This "compulsion" is different from "rational assent." We eat because we must, not because we have philosophized about the nature of nutrition. It is a life guided by instinct rather than intellect.
"We engage in the arts and crafts to sustain our lives."
Skepticism does not preclude professional expertise. One can practice medicine, carpentry, or navigation by following the rules of the trade (appearances and experience) without theorizing about the metaphysical laws of physics. Sextus himself was a physician who treated symptoms based on observation, proving one can be functional without being a dogmatist.
"We use language to communicate, not to state absolute truths."
When a Skeptic speaks, they use words loosely and non-dogmatically. If they say "This is good," they mean "This seems good to me now." They treat language as a pragmatic tool for social interaction, not as a system that perfectly mirrors reality. This linguistic flexibility prevents them from being trapped by their own words.
"Life is guided by the instruction of the arts."
Sextus values technical skill and learning. The "instruction of the arts" refers to the accumulated wisdom of human practice. A Skeptic can learn to play the flute or build a house. This acceptance of "know-how" (techne) stands in contrast to their rejection of "know-that" (episteme/theoretical knowledge).
"We yield to things which passively move the imagination."
This quote summarizes the Skeptic's relationship with the world. They do not actively project beliefs onto the world; they passively receive impressions. If a sunset looks beautiful, they yield to that impression and enjoy it. They simply stop short of analyzing the objective aesthetic value of the sunset.
"It is possible to live correctly without dogmatism."
This is the ultimate defense of the Skeptical way of life. Critics claimed Skepticism made life unlivable. Sextus argues the opposite: only without dogmatism can life be lived "correctly," meaning without unnecessary mental anguish. It is a validation of a life based on common sense rather than philosophical abstraction.
"The Skeptic is a philanthropist; he wishes to cure the dogmatists of their conceit."
Sextus frames his writing as a medical intervention. Just as a doctor cures the body, the Skeptic cures the mind of the disease of arrogance and rash opinion. The arguments are the medicine, administered to bring the patient to the peace of suspended judgment. It frames Skepticism as an act of compassion.
"We use arguments like a ladder; once we climb up, we kick it away."
Similar to a metaphor later used by Wittgenstein, Sextus implies that Skeptical arguments are tools to reach a state of *epoché*. Once that state is reached, the arguments themselves are no longer needed. The Skeptic does not even hold onto Skepticism as a dogma; it is a purgative that expels itself along with the disease.
"Let this be said not as a firm declaration, but as a report of what appears to me."
This final principle governs all Skeptical speech. It acts as a disclaimer attached to every sentence. By reducing all claims to subjective reports, the Skeptic remains invulnerable to refutation. You cannot prove I am wrong about how things *appear* to me.
The Legacy of the Great Doubter
The intellectual footprint of Sextus Empiricus is unique in the history of philosophy; he is the ghost that haunts the machinery of reason. While he did not establish a school that lasted into the Middle Ages, the rediscovery of his manuscripts in the 16th century acted as a demolition charge against the Scholastic dogmatism of the Church and the Aristotelian science of the time. Thinkers like Montaigne adopted Sextus’s motto "Que sais-je?" (What do I know?) to strip away human vanity, while Descartes used the methodological doubt inspired by Sextus to strip reality down to the "Cogito." However, where Descartes tried to rebuild certainty, Sextus would have been content to remain in the suspension.
Today, Sextus Empiricus is more relevant than ever. In a world saturated with "fake news," ideological extremism, and the Dunning-Kruger effect, the Pyrrhonian discipline of suspending judgment is a vital mental hygiene. Sextus teaches us the courage to say "I don't know" and the wisdom to distinguish between how things appear to us and what they truly are. He reminds us that the need for absolute certainty is often an emotional weakness, and that true strength—and tranquility—lies in the ability to endure the unresolved.
**What do you think? Is true tranquility possible without certainty, or is the suspension of judgment a recipe for apathy? Leave your thoughts in the comments below!**
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Pyrrho of Elis: The First Skeptic
To understand Sextus, one must look to his spiritual ancestor. Pyrrho was the semi-mythical founder of the movement, a man who allegedly lived in total indifference to his environment. While Sextus provided the arguments, Pyrrho provided the lifestyle. His radical detachment and pursuit of *ataraxia* set the template for all subsequent Skeptical thought.
Michel de Montaigne: The Renaissance Skeptic
Montaigne is the direct heir to Sextus Empiricus in the modern era. His *Essays* are saturated with Pyrrhonian influence, using self-examination and wit to dismantle human arrogance. If Sextus is the rigorous logician of doubt, Montaigne is its warm, humanistic poet, applying suspension of judgment to the everyday follies of life.
David Hume: The Great Infidel
David Hume took the arguments of Sextus regarding induction and causality and weaponized them against the Enlightenment's faith in reason. Hume represents the evolution of Skepticism into a tool for scientific and religious critique. Reading Hume is observing the arguments of Sextus Empiricus adapted for the modern world.